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Abstract
For central banks, it is crucial to develop and maintain risk identification frameworks that 
allow them to detect in good time and address potential threats to financial stability with 
the most appropriate policy tools. This paper reviews the main indicators developed for this 
purpose by the Banco de España and by other central banks and prudential authorities. 
In this way, this stocktaking exercise contributes to improving the transparency and 
effective communication of the financial stability-related tasks carried out at the Banco de 
España. Some of the indicators are used in regular Banco de España surveillance activities, 
whereas others pertain to specific research activities. We classify our set of measures 
into two broad categories depending on the risk monitored: standard or systemic risks. 
Given the multidimensional nature of systemic risk, its identification goes beyond the sum 
of the standard risks explored in this paper (namely credit, macroeconomic, market, and 
liquidity and bank risks). This survey also classifies indicators by the type of institutional 
segment that triggers risks; namely, sovereigns, households, non-financial corporations, 
banks, non-bank financial sector, residential real estate and the financial markets. This work 
shows how the measures developed and regularly used at the Banco de España allow 
potential vulnerabilities to be comprehensively monitored. Nevertheless, maintaining an 
adequate risk-identification framework requires continuous adaptation to new theoretical 
developments and econometric tools, and, more importantly, to emerging challenges. In 
this respect, there is a current drive to develop new indicators to assess potential risks 
arising from climate change and those linked to the risk of system-wide cyber incidents. It is 
expected that the monitoring needs related to these risks will increase in the future.
Keywords: risk identification, systemic risk, systemic risk indicators, standard risk 
indicators, financial stability.
JEL classification: E58, C43, G10, G21, G32, G50.
Resumen
Para los bancos centrales son cruciales el desarrollo y el mantenimiento de un marco de 
identificación de riesgos que permita la detección temprana de posibles amenazas para 
la estabilidad financiera y que facilite la aplicación de las políticas más adecuadas. Este 
documento resume los principales indicadores desarrollados para la identificación de 
riesgos tanto por parte del Banco de España como por otros bancos centrales y autoridades 
prudenciales. Así, esta recopilación de indicadores contribuye a mejorar la transparencia y 
la comunicación del Banco de España en su objetivo de potenciar la estabilidad del sistema 
financiero. El Banco de España utiliza algunos de estos indicadores en sus tareas regulares 
de identificación y seguimiento de riesgos, mientras que otros proceden de trabajos de 
investigación concretos. Este conjunto de medidas puede clasificarse en dos amplias 
categorías, en función del tipo de riesgo monitorizado: estándar o sistémico. Dada la 
naturaleza multidimensional del riesgo sistémico, su identificación va más allá de la propia 
suma de los riesgos estándar presentados en este documento (concretamente, riesgos 
de crédito, macroeconómico, de mercado, de liquidez y bancario). Este estudio también 
clasifica los indicadores en función del tipo de segmento institucional donde se originan 
los riesgos; concretamente, sector público, hogares, sociedades no financieras, bancos, 
sector financiero no bancario, mercado inmobiliario residencial y mercados financieros. Este 
trabajo muestra que los indicadores desarrollados y utilizados habitualmente por el Banco 
de España permiten una monitorización exhaustiva de las vulnerabilidades potenciales. En 
cualquier caso, el mantenimiento de un sistema de identificación de riesgos requiere una 
adaptación continua a los nuevos desarrollos teóricos y herramientas econométricas, así 
como a los nuevos desafíos. En este sentido, actualmente se están desarrollando nuevos 
indicadores para evaluar los riesgos derivados del cambio climático y los relacionados con 
los ciberriesgos. Se espera que las necesidades de seguimiento relacionadas con estos 
riesgos aumenten en el futuro.
Palabras clave: identificación de riesgos, riesgo sistémico, indicadores de riesgo sistémico, 
indicadores de riesgo estándar, estabilidad financiera.
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1 Introduction
Central banks play a key role in ensuring economic and financial stability. While the monetary 
policy function of central banks has been discussed extensively in the literature, their financial 
stability role has gained attention more recently, especially in the aftermath of the Great 
Financial Crisis (GFC). Thus, over the last decade central banks and prudential authorities 
have acquired greater responsibilities to preserve financial stability through the adoption 
of macroprudential policy frameworks. The objective of this new role is to strengthen 
financial stability by mitigating the risks stemming from macro-financial imbalances and 
the destabilising interactions across financial institutions and markets (Restoy, 2020).1 
Thus, central banks currently approach risks to financial stability from two complementary 
perspectives with the potential to interact: either entity by entity, in the case of the traditional 
microprudential approach, or system-wide for this new macroprudential approximation. 
However, despite the significant progress in this area, a full analytical framework with 
well-defined and quantifiable indicators for its correct functioning has yet to be developed 
(Mencía and Saurina, 2016). In particular, there is still no widespread consensus on which 
risk indicators should be used. Among other factors, this limitation of current identification 
frameworks is a result of the diffuse nature of financial stability objectives, which hinders 
risk identification, and the fact that macroprudential policy is still in its infancy. Besides, 
assessment of the stability of the financial system as a whole is complex as it involves the 
continuous monitoring and analysis of a wide range of potential risks and vulnerabilities that 
may threaten it. 
The development of an appropriate and transparent risk identification framework is 
crucial for at least two reasons. First, as shown in Figure 1, accurate risk identification is a 
prerequisite for achieving the final goal of financial stability. An adequate set of identification 
tools promotes an early and better-informed detection of potential threats and helps to 
address them by taking appropriate policy actions. Second, a proper communication of 
an adequate risk identification approach helps to increase the transparency of the financial 
stability function, which can itself contribute to reducing uncertainty (Oosterloo and de Haan, 
2004) and to stakeholders adopting mitigating actions.
The aim of this paper is to provide an overview of the main indicators used by the 
Banco de España to identify risks and vulnerabilities. Some of these measures are part of the 
regular surveillance work carried out by the Banco de España, whereas other indicators are 
the result of specific research activities. This survey allows the risk identification toolkit used 
at the Banco de España to be compared with that of other institutions, identifying potential 
gaps that may merit further work. However, a huge variety of diverse and heterogeneous 
1  In the case of Spain, Law 10/2014 on the regulation, supervision and solvency of credit institutions designates the 
Banco de España as the sectoral authority in charge of macroprudential policy to address systemic risks that pose 
a threat to the stability of the banking system. Besides, the Spanish Macroprudential Authority (AMCESFI) has the 
mandate to regularly monitor and analyse the sources of systemic risk. AMCESFI is headed by the Ministry of Economic 
Affairs  and Digital  Transformation with  the participation of  senior  officials  from  this Ministry  and  from  the Banco de 
España, the CNMV (Spanish National Securities Market Commission) and the DGSFP (Directorate General of Insurance 
and Pension Funds).
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indicators have been designed for risk identification, which illustrates the complexity of 
this type of analysis. Besides, the number of identification tools is constantly increasing, 
as a result of the development of new econometric methodologies and the incorporation 
of the experience of new crises. In fact, in the aftermath of the GFC, considerable attention 
has been devoted to the measurement of systemic risks and, in parallel, the literature has 
proposed a plethora of alternative risk metrics (see Bisias et al., 2012 and Hattori et al., 2014 
for some surveys). 
This abundance of indicators in the literature prevents us from attempting a 
comprehensive overview. Therefore, this survey contains a non-exhaustive summary of 
the main indicators developed and used by the Banco de España, and by other selected 
institutions. The different measures have been chosen in light of their relevance or their novel 
approach. They range from purely data-driven indicators to some identification instruments 
that require more complex models. 
As reported in Figure 1, indicators may be broadly classified into two groups 
depending on the nature of the risks they aim to capture: standard risks and systemic risk. 
First, we focus on five standard risk categories, namely: (1) credit risk, (2) macroeconomic risk, 
(3) market risk, (4) funding and liquidity risks, and (5) risks related to banks’ profitability and 
solvency. Our approach to classifying these categories draws on standard taxonomies of risk 
identification indicators (broadly used by central banks and other relevant institutions) such 
as that followed in the ESRB risk dashboard.2 Besides, we also examine different measures 
to analyse these standard risks across different segments (sovereigns, households, non-
financial corporations, banks, non-bank financial sector, residential real estate (RRE) and 
financial markets). Second, we review systemic risk indicators, which are linked to threats 
2  The ESRB risk dashboard is a non-exhaustive list of both quantitative and qualitative indicators to measure systemic risk 
https://www.esrb.europa.eu/pub/rd/html/index.en.html.
RISK IDENTIFICATION IS AT THE HEART OF THE FINANCIAL STABILITY FUNCTION OF CENTRAL BANKS 
Figure 1
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that may affect a significant part or the whole of the financial system and, ultimately, the 
real economy too. For these indicators, we use a standard classification that depends on 
whether they aim to capture the time dimension of systemic risks (i.e. the accumulation of 
risks over the credit cycle) or the structural cross-section dimension of systemic risk. Finally, 
we also analyse other sources of systemic risk which merit further study, namely climate 
change-related risks and some operational risks, such as cyber risks.3 The Appendix briefly 
summarises all the indicators portrayed in this document.
This paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we summarise the main indicators 
developed at the Banco de España and by other central banks and prudential authorities for 
the analysis of standard risk categories. Section 3 then reviews the main tools to address 
systemic risks. Finally, Section 4 concludes.
3  For example, operational risk is one of the areas for which this survey lacks a complete description of the attendant 
indicators and identification instruments, as it falls outside the scope of this survey. 
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2 Standard risks
Our approach to classify traditional risk categories is inspired by standard taxonomies 
commonly employed by central banks. Specifically, we focus on the indicators related to 
six different categories, namely: (1) credit risk, (2) macroeconomic risk, (3) market risk, (4) 
funding and liquidity risks, (5) banks’ profitability and solvency and (6) structural risks. The 
huge variety of indicators across risk categories and segments advocates prioritising the 
indicators examined in this section, rather than an exhaustive listing. Therefore, indicators 
have been chosen for their widespread use or their importance in terms of early-warning 
properties to signal systemic financial crises.
2.1 Credit risk
Credit risk may be defined as the potential that the borrowing counterparty in a debt 
contract will fail to meet its obligations in accordance with agreed terms. In this section, we 
summarise the main indicators to identify this risk for two types of borrowers (households 
and non-financial corporations), and for the specific case of loans related to activities in the 
real estate market.
2.1.1 Households
Aggregate indicators of households’ financial position, such as their aggregate debt-to-
income ratios or their debt-to-wealth position, provide interpretable information about the 
financial situation of the population as a whole. However, those magnitudes alone cannot 
indicate whether a small set of households is heavily indebted or whether, alternatively, many 
households have a limited amount of debt. The aggregate consequences may differ across 
both scenarios, because financial fragility depends precisely on the resources available to 
indebted households to keep up with their payments.
Against this background, disaggregated information on household debts, payments 
and income together with socio-demographic data allow us to characterise which population 
groups are most vulnerable. The Spanish Survey of Household Finances (EFF) has been 
conducted by the Banco de España since 2002 every three years, and collects such 
information together with data on Spanish household assets and spending.
One initial use of this dataset is to calculate vulnerability measures among indebted 
households. That is to say, unlike debt-to-GDP ratios, disaggregated data on households allow 
calculation of the fraction of households that owe more than three times their gross income, 
or that devote more than 40% of their gross income to debt payments (see Banco de España, 
2019a or HFCN, 2020). Chart 1.1 shows both measures from 2002 to 2017. Debt payments 
relative to income could be interpreted as a proxy for short-term financial commitments, while 
outstanding debt as a proportion of income approximates long-term financial commitments.
In addition, survey information about the complete balance sheet of households 
enables reconstruction of the total amount of resources available in the event of an interest 
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rate increase or a fall in income. Given the delays in the release of that information, stress 
tests are used to simulate the impact of macro developments and, at the same time, to 
detect vulnerable groups (see IMF, 2012; Bhutta et al., 2020; or Ampudia et al., 2016).
Again, given delays in the release of disaggregated information, distributional 
financial accounts have recently been constructed by combining data on macroeconomic 
developments with household balance sheets (see Batty et al., 2019 and Ahnert et al., 2020). 
Under this approach, the distribution of household indebtedness across population groups 
becomes a timelier indicator. Chart 1.2 presents preliminary estimates of a work in progress 
at the Banco de España on the annual distribution of total outstanding debt for residential 
purchase across income groups in Spain. A larger (smaller) share of cumulative debt in 
groups with lower income indicates potentially larger (smaller) financial vulnerabilities.
2.1.2 Non-financial corporations
Vulnerable non-financial corporations (NFC) could have a direct impact on economic growth 
and add pressures to the banking system. This central role explains why national and 
supranational surveillance authorities closely monitor developments in this sector, notably 
through the analysis of their financial position. Along these lines, there is a broad use of 
HOUSEHOLD CREDIT RISK
Chart 1
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a Population estimates.
b The distribution of the aggregate debt for residential purchase across income quintiles of the population is calculated on an annual basis. The 
distributions are based on Chow-Lin (1971) using EFF and Financial Accounts data over the period 2002 to 2017. The data points after 2017 
are out-of-sample estimations based on Financial Accounts data. These are preliminary results of a work in progress at the Banco de España by 
Cobreros, García-Uribe & Villanueva (2021).
While the fraction of households that assign more than 40% of their gross income to debt payments proxies for short-term financial 
commitments, the proportion of households with outstanding debt more than threefold their gross annual income proxies for long-term 
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financial indicators such as the growth rates of loans to NFCs, the cost of borrowing for 
NFCs and the changes in credit standards for loans to NFCs, among others.4 Besides, since 
the onset of the GFC, credit default swap (CDS) spreads have gained importance as a tool 
for approximating credit risk – not only for corporates, but also for banks and sovereigns – as 
this market becomes more liquid.5
Furthermore, the Banco de España also closely monitors the evolution of the most 
vulnerable firms on a granular basis. This is supported by the empirical evidence that links a 
higher share of these firms to lower investment and employment growth of the non-vulnerable 
firms and less productivity-enhancing capital reallocation (McGowan et al., 2017).6 To that 
end, Menéndez and Mulino (2019) focus on the distribution of the interest coverage ratio 
(ICR), and pay special attention to the size and sector of activity – see Chart 2 –.7 The ICR is 
the ratio of ordinary profit (i.e. gross operating profit plus financial revenue) to financial costs, 
and it serves as an indicator of the degree of the firm’s financial pressure. In particular, when 
the ICR value remains below one over a prolonged period it is considered to be a sign of 
vulnerability, since it implies that the firm is not capable of paying the interest on its debt out 
of ordinary profit in a sustained manner. This approach also enables the Banco de España to 
simulate potential liquidity needs under severe stress situations such as that posed by the 
COVID-19 pandemic shock (Blanco et al., 2020).
The Banco de España also assesses the credit quality of the NFCs in the context 
of the implementation of monetary policy. In line with its statute, the Eurosystem provides 
liquidity to monetary policy counterparties only against the provision of collateral that 
meets adequate credit standards. The measurement of credit quality is based on ratings 
or probabilities of default from any of the following sources: external credit assessment 
institutions (ECAIs); in-house models developed by counterparties to calculate minimum 
capital requirements under the internal ratings-based (IRB) approach; and national central 
banks’ in-house credit assessment systems (ICAS). To facilitate the provision of adequate 
collateral, the Banco de España has developed an ICAS (ICAS BdE) compliant with the 
Eurosystem Credit Assessment Framework (ECAF). The ICAS BdE performs credit 
assessments of public and private Spanish NFCs, with the aim of allowing the loans 
extended to them to be used as collateral by the counterparties themselves.8 The rating 
4  For more details on data-based risk indicators for NFCs see, for instance, the ESRB risk dashboard https://www.esrb.
europa.eu/pub/rd/html/index.en.html.
5  A CDS is an OTC (over-the-counter) derivative that functions as an insurance contract, where a protection buyer pays 
a fixed amount (the CDS premium) to the seller until maturity or until the occurrence of the credit event (Duffie, 1999). 




decline in OECD potential output growth through two key channels: business investment and multi-factor productivity 
growth.
7   To  that end, Menéndez and Mulino  (2019)  resort  to  the CBI  (Integrated Central Balance Sheet Data Office Survey), 
obtained on the basis of merging the CBA (CBSO Annual Survey) and the CBB (information on company filings with the 
Spanish Mercantile Registries). The CBI contains information on the balance sheets and income statements of a most 
extensive sample of companies, which enables the ICR to be calculated for each of these companies in each year.
8  https://repositorio.bde.es/bitstream/123456789/13555/1/Banco_Espana_in_house_credit.pdf.
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model is calculated in two stages. First, the statistical model, which provides an automatic 
rating based on the latest financial statements of the company, is obtained in the spirit of 
Papke and Wooldridge (1996). Second, the expert model allows the analyst to incorporate 
all those relevant aspects that the statistical model has not been able to capture in the final 
rating of the company. Currently, the ICAS BdE rates around one million companies via 
statistical and expert models.
2.1.3 Real estate markets
House prices have sometimes been used as an indicator of the financial cycle and, in fact, 
they usually fluctuate in tandem with credit, sometimes amplifying it. In particular, rapid 
increases in real estate prices impact on the availability of borrowers’ collateral and may 
trigger excessive credit growth (Galati et al., 2016; Rünstler and Vlekke, 2018). For this 
reason, it is important to regularly monitor house prices and spot signs of overvaluation in 
the housing market in early phases of the cycle. Overvaluation (undervaluation) occurs when 
house prices are too high (too low) compared to a non-observable equilibrium level.
Micro and macro supervisors actively monitor house price developments (see, for 
instance, the analytical framework of ESRB, 2019). The monitoring framework of the Banco 
de España relies on two sets of methodologies to estimate the degree of overvaluation in the 
NON-FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS' CREDIT RISK
Chart 2
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a Newly created companies and holding companies are excluded from the sample. The size of non-financial corporations is defined in line with 
European Commission Recommendation 2003/361/EC. CBQ stands for the Central Balance Sheet Data Office Quarterly Survey. The data source 
of all the indicators except the CBQ is the CBI (Integrated Central Balance Sheet Data Office Survey).
b Percentage of total debt of their group.
c Percentage of total employment of their group.
Non-financial corporations' credit risk is assessed by analysing the proportion of debt and employment associated with vulnerable firms. 
Vulnerable firms are defined as those having an Interest Coverage Ratio [(gross operating profit + financial revenue) / financial costs] of less 
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real estate market. The first approach is purely statistical and aims to identify large deviations 
in house price variables from long-term trends. Trends are obtained with a Hodrick-Prescott 
filter to separate cyclical from long-run components (Hodrick and Prescott, 1997). If prices 
are too high in relation to their trend, they could be overvalued. 
The second approach to the analysis of imbalances is model-based. Given that the 
relationship between house prices and some fundamental variables describes patterns that 
can be fitted, models may help to understand the key drivers of changes in house prices. 
For instance, Martínez and Maza (2003) measure the degree of disequilibrium in the Spanish 
real estate market with a model where house prices are regressed, among other explanatory 
variables, on household disposable income per inhabitant or the mortgage rate on new 
loans. If the estimated prices stand below the observed prices, the market is said to be 
overvalued. The Banco de España also complements this analysis through equations that 
explain house prices by means of Hodrick-Prescott filtered trends in fundamental variables, 
such as disposable income or rental prices. In this case, departures from long-term trends 
would be consistent with a build-up of vulnerabilities (see Chart 3.1).
Regarding alternative model-based indicators to analyse overvaluation in the real 
estate markets, it is worth highlighting the “misalignment indicator” of the ECB (2016). It is 
based on a Bayesian model that explains real house prices using real disposable income 
per household, the real housing stock per capita and the mortgage rate as explanatory 
variables.9 The residuals represent the misalignment or the degree of overvaluation of house 
prices. Alternatively, the misalignment may also be calculated comparing the return on 
investing in housing to yields in the rental market (or to the return on assets with similar risk). 
See ECB (2011) for a survey or Hiebert and Sydow (2011) for an application to euro area 
markets.
The Great Financial Crisis (GFC) showed that policymakers need to consider not 
only the most likely (baseline trend) future path of house prices, but also the distribution of all 
possible outcomes around that path, and pay special attention to the downside risk. In this 
connection, House Price-at-Risk (HaR) measures, which are based on quantile regressions, 
enable the whole distribution of future price growth rates to be fully characterized and the 
accumulation of downside risks in the housing market to be identified. Specifically, the 
HaR measure consists of forecasting extreme realisations in the left tail of the conditional 
distribution of real house prices (commonly the 5th percentile) to identify risks of large price 
falls. The development of these tools is based on the application of quantile regressions and 
it is key for policymakers owing to the close relationship between house price dynamics, 
macroeconomics and financial stability.
Different institutions increasingly calculate their own House Price-at-Risk (HaR) 
measures. For example, the IMF fits a HaR model for 22 major advanced economies and 
9   The Bayesian techniques allow the distributions of model coefficients to be modified according to their estimated values 
in other papers.
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10 EMEs, and the ECB estimates a HaR model for the euro area.10 In both cases they 
document the usefulness of the HaR measure as an early-warning indicator that can be 
used for financial stability surveillance. The Banco de España is also developing a HaR 
model that captures the idiosyncratic developments of the Spanish real estate market (see 
Galán and Rodríguez, 2020). To demonstrate the usefulness of this tool, Chart 3.2 depicts 
the deterioration of the density function of real house price growth from 2005 to 2008 for 
the 1-year-ahead forecast horizon. The sizable shift of the full distribution to the left clearly 
signals an increase in downside risk, even in positive scenarios.
Additionally, the link between the deterioration in lending standards, or the quality of 
loans, and systemic crises is well-documented in the literature (see, for instance, Duca et al., 
2010; Estrada and Saurina, 2016; Kelly et al., 2018). Certainly, there are multiple examples of 
lax credit standards translating into higher default rates in mortgages during downturns in the 
real estate market (Schelkle, 2018). In this respect, awareness has increased in recent years 
10   The set of explanatory variables of the HaR model of the IMF includes a financial condition index, real GDP growth, 




MONITORING HOUSE PRICE DISEQUILIBRIA IN REAL ESTATE MARKETS
Chart 3
SOURCES: Banco de España, INE and own elaboration.
a Grey shaded areas represent systemic crisis periods. Ranges show minimum and maximum values of a set of indicators of RRE prices relative to 
their long-term trends. Some of these indicators are obtained using a statistical filter and others using econometric models.
b Forecast density functions in three periods: i) 2005 Q1; ii) 2007 Q2; and iii) 2008 Q3. See Galán and Rodríguez-Moreno (2020) for details.
To monitor house prices, the Banco de España relies on several methodologies to estimate the degree of overvaluation in the real estate 
market. Moreover, central banks increasingly make use of quantile regression models, such as the House Price at Risk (HaR) model. 
Specifically, the HaR measure consists of forecasting extreme realisations in the left tail of the conditional distribution of real house prices to 
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on the need to closely monitor lending standards in the real estate market. For instance, 
the Recommendation of the European Systemic Risk Board ESRB/2016/14, on closing 
real estate data gaps, is an important initiative to construct a complete set of harmonised 
indicators to monitor vulnerabilities in this segment.11 The ECB (2019) has also proposed a 
formal framework to define the intensity of vulnerabilities arising from overly easy lending 
standards. This framework relies on early-warning models that consider the distribution of 
indicators over time and across countries together with the subsequent likelihood of crises.12
In this connection, the Banco de España regularly evaluates lending standards 
on new credit for the residential mortgage market as this represents the largest segment 
of collateralised loans. To this end, the Banco de España regularly calculates indicators 
from its credit register and from administrative data (land registries). These measures could 
refer either to leverage, to the terms of mortgage contracts or the situation of the borrower. 
Among the former, the loan-to-price (LTP) measure developed by Bover et al. (2019), which 
11  The Recommendation addresses supranational and national authorities in the European Union and asks for the 
implementation of a comprehensive dashboard of indicators, including indicators for the physical market, credit 
growth and, of course, lending standards. The monitoring framework of the Banco de España is fully aligned with the 
provisions of the ESRB Recommendation and with the other orientations of this institution.
12  Analogous approaches can be found in Bengtsson et al. (2020) and Ferrari et al. (2015). The IMF (2010) follows a 
similar methodology but integrates lending standards and other real estate indicators into a single vulnerability index.
CREDIT RISK IN THE REAL ESTATE MARKET: LENDING STANDARDS
Chart 4
SOURCES: Banco de España and Colegio de Registradores (land registries).
a LTP data refer to a representative sample of mortgage loans.
b The index captures the risk of new mortgage lending, calculated on a quarterly basis. Higher values imply more risk. The index takes into account the 
riskiness of mortgages using a default probability model, in which lending standards are explanatory variables of default rates. The model is estimated 
over the period 2003-2017 following Galán and Lamas (2019), with some adjustments. The data points after 2017 are out-of-sample estimates.
The share of loans with high leverage (LTP > 80%) diminished after the outbreak of the financial crisis, and it has remained broadly unchanged 
in recent years. A synthetic indicator or credit-at-risk, which is based on the probability of default of new mortgage loans, suggests that the 
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is the ratio between the principal amount of the loan to the price of the house, represents 
a material driver of defaults (Galán and Lamas, 2019). Indeed, the share of loans with high 
LTP values (i.e. an LTP of over 80%) was particularly high in Spain before the financial crisis, 
which coincided with booming conditions in the housing market (Chart 4.1). Other indicators 
that explain default risk include the maturity and the spread of mortgages over a risk-free 
rate, and metrics that proxy borrowers’ ability to pay, such as the ratio of the principal 
amount of the loan to the borrower’s income, i.e. the loan-to-income ratio (LTI). In general, 
longer maturities, wider spreads and higher LTI are associated with higher risk.
While individual indicators (and their distributions) provide useful information on 
different aspects of credit, they sometimes do not move in tandem, and can even emit 
ambiguous signals. For instance, during upturns LTP ratios may remain unchanged while 
LTI may deteriorate. To address this issue, the Banco de España has developed a synthetic 
indicator, the so-called “credit-at-risk”, which estimates the risk of new mortgage operations 
by means of a default probability model with lending standard indicators as explanatory 
variables (see Banco de España, 2019b, for details). Chart 4.2 exhibits the course of this 
indicator, which depicts the expected pattern of growing vulnerabilities in the run-up to the 
financial crisis and more contained risks in the most recent period.
2.2 Macroeconomic risk
2.2.1 International environment
Risks from the external environment refer to the potential consequences for the Spanish 
financial system of the negative economic, financial or political performance of those 
countries in which Spanish companies and banks have higher investment positions. In this 
section we highlight two of the indices that the Banco de España has developed to monitor 
these external risks in its regular assessment: a synthetic index of the vulnerability of the 
most relevant emerging economies (EMEs) for Spain, the so-called “Sherloc”,13 and an 
Economic Policy Uncertainty (EPU) index (see Chart 5). 
First, the Sherloc index of vulnerability for EMEs by Alonso and Molina (2019) is a 
tool to detect the accumulation of risks in 25 large EMEs for three different types of crisis 
(sovereign, currency and banking crises). The index is calculated via a signalling approach 
and a logistic estimation that allows the predicted probability of being in a vulnerable state to 
be obtained for each type of crisis. In-sample and out-of-sample, this index outperforms the 
best single crisis indicators, such as the sovereign spread or the credit change in real terms. 
Besides, the use of a synthetic index for each type of crisis predicts vulnerable states better 
than the use of an aggregate index for all crises.
Along these same lines, policy uncertainty can also affect banks’ and firms’ 
performance in the most relevant EMEs for Spain, which have historically been prone to 
13  “Sherloc” stands for Signalling Heightened Emerging Risks that Lead to the Occurrence of Crises. See Alonso and 
Molina (2019).
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suffer from abrupt policy changes. The Banco de España estimates an Economic Policy 
Uncertainty (EPU) index for Spain and the seven largest economies of Latin America (see 
Ghirelli et al., 2019 and Ghirelli et al., 2020). The procedure, which follows the seminal 
paper by Baker et al. (2016), consists of analysing the number of articles that contain 
simultaneously at least one keyword related to the categories of “uncertainty”, “economy” 
and “policy”.14
The above-mentioned indices employed to analyse the external environment are 
useful for monitoring country risk. In particular, country risk arises in transactions with 
holders resident in a given country due to circumstances other than standard commercial 
risk. Therefore, this risk is a broad concept that does not only include sovereign default 
risk but also that of private external debt derived from circumstances unrelated to the 
solvency or liquidity status of the private debtor, and usually related to transfer risk.15 The 
assessment of country risk is usually based on both risk models and experts’ judgments. 
The best-known econometric approach is the Country Risk Assessment Model (CRAM) 
14  These EPU indices can also be used to quantify the macroeconomic impact of political uncertainty by means of SVAR 
models. Thus, an unexpected shock in the EPU leads to negative responses in Spanish GDP, private consumption and 
investment (Ghirelli et al., 2019).
15  For further information, see Iranzo (2008).
MACROECONOMIC RISK: INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT
Chart 5
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a Probability of being in a vulnerable state for currency, banking or sovereign crises, estimated from a signalling and a logit approach. Average of 
countries belonging to each region. For more information, see Alonso and Molina (2019).
b Articles containing words related to economic policy and uncertainty in the 7 main Spanish newspapers, with reference to each country. For more 
information, see Ghirelli, Gil, Pérez and Urtasun (2020).
Among others, the Banco de España uses two indices to assess macroeconomic risks arising from the international environment: the 
SHERLOC and the Economic Policy Uncertainty (EPU indices). The former is a synthetic index of the probability of being in a vulnerable state 
against a currency, sovereign or banking crisis, whereas the latter reflects the frequency of articles in leading newspapers that contain 
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used by the OECD to deliver its country risk classification.16 Another approach is 
the development of internal credit ratings to assess the credit quality of investment 
counterparties. For instance, Bank of Canada has developed this method based on 
the scoring methodology by Muller and Bourque (2017).17 Finally, sovereign ratings and 
market indicators, such as the sovereign and CDS spreads or the EMBI+, also provide 
useful information to detect risks in these third countries. These market-based indicators 
are supposed to be early indicators of sovereign risk, but they can also overreact due to 
short-term events.
2.2.2 Current account imbalances
External imbalances are a symptom of an unsustainable pattern of global growth (Blanchard 
and Milesi-Ferretti, 2009). These imbalances are traditionally characterised as divergences 
in the current accounts of surplus and deficit countries. This indicator is regularly monitored 
at the Banco de España, along with additional commonly used indicators, such as the net 
international investment position (NIIP), the net external debt and the net external position 
(either in portfolio, FDI or other investment). Recently, Alberola et al. (2020) have analysed 
the role played by the net foreign assets (NFA) position of creditor and debtor countries to 
characterise global imbalances from a stock perspective.18 
Against this background, the development of early-warning indicators of external 
stress events is key to identifying potential turbulence in international markets and 
implementing suitable policies. More specifically, Martín (2017) constructs an early-warning 
system of external stress episodes for a set of euro area countries. His results show that the 
ratio of net and gross foreign liabilities to GDP and current account imbalances are significant 
stress predictors. This study finds that euro area peripheral countries‘ external indebtedness 
remains higher than the proposed risk threshold. However, this type of analysis entails some 
caveats. First, these early-warning indicators are based on historical crisis observations, so 
that triggers from future episodes may differ from past ones. Besides, the predictive power 
of out-of-sample forecasts significantly falls. Finally, data quality limitations could reduce its 
usefulness as policy tool.
2.2.3 Public sector vulnerabilities
Heightened and protracted public debt levels are associated with several risks, ranging 
from economic slowdowns to limited fiscal room for manoeuvre or greater vulnerability to 
changes in market investor sentiment. Against this backdrop, several frameworks have been 
proposed to help identify and quantify risks to fiscal sustainability. Some methodologies 
16   This model is developed by the Belgian export credit agency (ONDD) and its details remain confidential.
17  Muller and Bourque (2017) assign an internal rating to sovereigns based on the institutional framework of countries, 
their economic outlook, their external vulnerabilities, fiscal flexibility and monetary policy. These ratings are used by 
the Bank of Canada “to set eligibility requirements and credit limits as part of the Bank’s and government’s risk-
management policy”.
18  Their results show that stock imbalances are self-correcting in debtor countries but self-feeding in creditor countries. 
This asymmetry is mostly explained by the differential behavior of the trade balance, which fails to adjust in the case 
of creditors.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 22 DOCUMENTO OCASIONAL N.º 2125
have focused on the calculation of early-warning indicators, aimed at signalling the build-up 
of fiscal stress in advance and helping prevent crises by means of a timely counteraction of 
fiscal and macroeconomic policies (see Hernández de Cos et al., 2014).
More recently, the analysis of fiscal sustainability has evolved towards the use of 
debt sustainability analysis (DSA) frameworks. These tools are currently employed by most 
international organisations and financial institutions in their surveillance of fiscal imbalances. 
The European Central Bank (ECB) also produces and maintains its own DSA 
framework (see Bouabdallah et al., 2017). This tool generates a score that measures risks to 
fiscal sustainability (ranging from low to very high), by combining three main building blocks: 
i) a deterministic analysis based on the debt-to-GDP path as a response to economic 
shocks, ii) stochastic simulations to provide uncertainty around the benchmark estimates, 
and iii) the use of a very broad set of fiscal indicators that provide information on potential 
liabilities and challenges to the sustainability of public finances in the short and medium run.
When applied to the case of Spain, the DSA documents the impact of macroeconomic 
conditions on the health of public finances, especially during the Great Recession (see 
Chart 6). Although the risks to public debt sustainability had gradually eased from their peak 
in 2013, these have risen in 2020, against the background of the fiscal effort enacted to 
combat the economic consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic.
Despite its usefulness in tracking risks to debt sustainability, it should be noted that 
the composition of this indicator relies on the precise measurement of variables, such as the 
MACROECONOMIC RISK: SOVEREIGN DEBT SUSTAINABILITY RISK INDICATOR IN SPAIN
Chart 6
SOURCE: Own elaboration based on Boubdalla et al. (2017).
The sovereign debt sustainability risk indicator draws together information from a large number of variables and simulations on the dynamics 
of public debt and its determinants. Its course highlights the impact of worsening macroeconomic conditions on the health of public finances, 
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output gap or potential GDP, which cannot be accurately assessed in real time. Therefore, its 
interpretation should take into account the uncertainty over the estimates.
2.2.4 Growth-at-risk
Historically, financial crises have been accompanied by large GDP losses (Claessens 
et al., 2012; Aikman et al., 2015). Against this background, Adrian et al. (2019a) identify 
the fact that tight financial conditions have large negative effects on the left tail of the 
GDP growth distribution. That is to say, deteriorating growth-at-risk (GaR), defined as the 
growth rate observed under an adverse scenario that occurs with certain probability (e.g. 
5%). The concept of GaR is of great importance for financial stability given its link with 
the occurrence and severity of financial crises. In this context, Galán (2020) extends the 
use of quantile regressions of GDP growth to account for cyclical risk, financial stress and 
macroprudential policy. This model is a useful tool to assess the effects of macrofinancial 
risk on the GDP growth distribution and how macroprudential measures can mitigate 
them.
In particular, the GaR model implemented by the Banco de España distinguishes 
between the risks derived from the build-up of cyclical imbalances and those derived 
from the materialisation of financial stress events, while accounting for their interaction 
and their impact over time. The inclusion of macroprudential policy variables also allows 
the identification of the macroprudential policy stance and the assessment of the impact 
of their implementation. Here, Galán (2020) identifies positive and significant effects of 
macroprudential policy on GaR, which may offset the negative effects of the accumulation 
of systemic risk and financial shocks. In particular, the increased probability of future severe 
contractions (increase in the left-skewness of the GDP growth distribution) as a consequence 
of the accumulation of financial imbalances during expansionary periods can be mitigated 
by tightening macroprudential policy, which reduces the magnitude of the GDP losses 
observed under future adverse scenarios (see Chart 7).
2.2.5 Inflation
Price stability is a primary objective of the ECB, which conducts monetary policy to achieve 
the goal of low and stable inflation, while maintaining financial stability. Price stability 
implies that prices should not go up (inflation) significantly, and an ongoing period of 
falling prices (deflation) should also be avoided. The Banco de España closely monitors 
inflation and inflation expectations. To that end, the Banco de España employs a wide 
range of measures. For instance, inflation swaps provide information on market inflation 
expectations at different horizons (see Chart 8.1). In addition, the Banco de España also 
uses internal models to extract implicit probabilities of being in a situation of deflation at 
different horizons (see Chart 8.2).
Commodity prices also provide useful information on inflation. Oil affects inflation 
through different channels: direct first-round effects on consumers (higher energy bills), 
indirect effects on producers (higher production costs) and second-round effects related 
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MACROECONOMIC RISK: GROWTH-AT-RISK (GaR)
Chart 7
SOURCE: Galán (2020).
a Estimated 8-quarters-ahead GDP growth distributions obtained after mapping the fitted values of quantile regressions of GDP growth into a probability 
density function using a kernel-based method. The regressors include variables related to cyclical risk, financial stress, macroprudential policy, binary 
variables distinguishing between expansionary and crisis periods, and their interactions with macroprudential policy. The grey density represents 
average values under a normal-times situation, defined as periods not classified as expansions or crises; the red density represents the average values 
in an expansion of the financial cycle; and the blue density represents the GDP growth distribution after tightening one macroprudential measure 
departing from the expansion scenario. The circles denote the growth-at-risk (5th percentile) estimations. For more details, see Galán (2020).
The GDP growth distribution changes throughout the financial cycle (a). The build-up of cyclical risk during financial expansions increases the 
left skewness of the GDP growth distribution, which increases the downside risk of GDP growth. Macroprudential policy may offset the 
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SOURCES: Refinitiv Datastream and own elaboration based on Bloomberg Data License.
a Monthly averages.
b Implicit forward calculated from Inflation-Linked Swaps.
c Calculated from forward rates 2y 2y and 5y 5y obtained with a joint estimation of the implicit density function of 1y through 10y inflation rates (see 
Gimeno and Ibañez, 2017) using euro area daily swaps and inflation options data.
The Banco de España closely monitors inflation and inflation expectations by means of different measures. For instance, inflation swaps 
provide information on market inflation expectations at different horizons, and internal models allow implicit probabilities of entering into a 
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to agents’ expectations that affect consumption and investment plans.19 In this context, 
correctly disentangling the drivers of oil price dynamics is fundamental for the calibration of 
the monetary policy response.20 There are different approaches to assessing the relevance 
of supply and demand factors. For instance, the NY Federal Reserve identifies supply and 
demand shocks by looking at their impact on financial prices21, while Kilian and Muphy 
(2014) propose a structural vector autoregressive (SVAR) model with sign restrictions to 
identify global demand, oil supply and precautionary demand shocks. Moreover, future oil 
prices are generally seen as a reflection of market expectations of future oil spot prices, and 
are therefore widely used for oil price projections. Finally, commodity prices are major drivers 
of capital flows to emerging market economies, especially for Latin American countries, thus 
amplifying or mitigating global financial cycles (Molina and Viani, 2019).
2.3 Market risk
According to the EBA, market risk can be defined as “the risk of losses in on and off-balance 
sheet positions arising from adverse movements in market prices”.22 There are numerous, 
widely used market risk indicators to address this risk, such as equity indices, exchange rates 
and interest rates. In this section, we focus on two families of measures. Namely, implied 
volatility measures and price-to-earnings ratios (PERs) (see Chart 9 for an illustration). 
First, implied volatility indices are broadly used by central banks to interpret and 
forecast current and future stock price dynamics for different markets (i.e. equity, fixed 
income, exchange rates, commodity markets and ETFs markets).23 These indices reflect the 
market expectations for the future volatility of the underlying asset. For the specific case of 
the VIX, which is derived from the S&P 500 options, there is evidence backing its capacity 
to proxy global risk aversion, lead market uncertainty and forecast volatility and returns,24 
and even economic activity.25 Given the leading indicator capacity of implied volatility 
indices also at a regional level, most analysts, including central banks, use in their regular 
assessment not only the VIX but also other regional VIX-like indices, such as the VSTOXX, 
VDAX, VCAC, VIBEX, VSMI, and customised volatility indices of interest. The wide variety 
of volatility indices recently aroused interest among researchers to calculate a common 
19   However, in recent years the pass-through of oil to inflation has weakened considerably, partly due to an increase in 
energy efficiency and the globalisation of the economy in which most of the value added by companies is in the form 




variables which have maximum explanatory content for oil-price changes, and then examine the estimated factors to 
determine whether they resemble a demand or supply shock.
22  https://www.eba.europa.eu/regulation-and-policy/market-risk.
23  Among the more broadly used volatility indices on commodities and exchange rates, it is worth highlighting the OVX 
(oil), EVZ (euro), and GVZ (gold). The literature supports the use of the CBOE crude OVX to forecast future oil spot 





25  Bekaert and Hoerova (2014), Tiwari et al. (2019), Cesa-Bianchi et al. (2020), and Bhattarai et al. (2020), among others.
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volatility factor to identify the main volatility drivers worldwide (see, for instance, Londono 
and Wilson, 2018). Recently, González-Pérez (2019) have made use of the information 
content of the idiosyncratic volatility component of these factor models to study spillovers 
across markets.26
The second set of indicators studies to what extent the price of an asset is 
misaligned with the value justified by its current and future economic fundamentals. Indeed, 
there is an increasing amount of research that analyses whether these indicators could 
anticipate potential market bubbles.27 Such indicators include the price-to-earnings ratio 
(PER), and equity risk premium proxies. The PER ratio relates the risk of current or future 
market overvaluation to investors’ future cash flow expectations. Their dynamics incorporate 
investors’ beliefs about future cash-flows, economic activity and growth. One limitation of 
the PER is that current profit and dividend information is used to calculate it, so that this 
measure is influenced by cyclical patterns in these variables. For this reason, Campbell 
and Shiller (1998) proposed the CAPE (Cyclically-Adjusted Price to Earnings ratio), which 
smooths out the standard PER.28 The excess CAPE yield (inverse CAPE minus the 10-year 
secured bond yield) is also useful for approaching stock market profit expectations, helping 
26  News-based indicators also contribute to monitoring market risk. For instance, Baker et al. (2019) propose a daily 
newspaper-based Equity Market Volatility (EMV) index that tracks VIX and S&P500 movements as a result of changes 
in a variety of uncertainty sources.
27  See, among others, Gonçalves and Laonard (2021).
28   To calculate the CAPE the standard PER should be divided by the last ten years’ average inflation-adjusted earnings 
to assess the long-term performance, under the assumption that economic cycles last from around six to seven years.
MARKET RISK INDICATORS
Chart 9
SOURCES: CBOE and Bloomberg.
Market risk is associated with asset value losses as a consequence of adverse price movements. Indicators used to assess this risk include 
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to portray the expected stock earnings per share above the risk-free rate (Shiller et al., 2020), 
and even for approaching likely bubbles. Finally, the implied equity risk premium could be 
defined as the excess expected return from the equity market over the bond market.29
2.4 Funding and liquidity risk
Funding liquidity is the ability to settle obligations when due. Consequently, funding liquidity 
risk is related to the possibility of failing to settle obligations with immediacy over a specific 
horizon (Drehmann and Nikolaou, 2009). The materialisation of funding liquidity risks was 
at the core of the onset of the great financial crisis (GFC), as many market intermediaries, 
including banks, relied excessively on short-term debt, and were unable to meet their financial 
obligations when market conditions worsened. This in turn prompted massive central bank 
liquidity injections and, over time, resulted in the introduction of new liquidity tools in the 
regulatory framework to increase the resilience of the financial system to liquidity shocks.30 
A well-known indicator of liquidity stress is the Libor-OIS spread, which is the 
difference between the Libor, a representative interest rate in the interbank market, and 
a risk-free interest rate of the swap market (for a specified term). Different versions of this 
spread include the Euribor-OIS spread (depicted in Chart 10) and the TED spread. When the 
spread increases, banks charge a premium for lending money to their peers over the risk-
free rate. This premium has been found to embed both credit risk and liquidity risk (see Akdi 
et al., 2020; McAndrews et al., 2008; Michaud and Upper, 2008; Sengupta and Tam, 2008; 
among others).
Another relevant indicator of liquidity tensions are the implicit borrowing costs in 
cross-currency swaps (CCS) contracts. A CCS is an agreement to borrow in one currency 
(e.g. dollars) from a counterparty, and lend in another (e.g. euro) to this same counterparty 
(by way of illustration, Chart 10 shows the EUR/USD CCS). During the life of the CCS the 
two parties also exchange interest payments in the two currencies. In theory, borrowing 
costs using a CCS should be similar to the cost of taking out loans in another currency in the 
cash market.31 Distortions in CCS instruments have persisted since the onset of the GFC, 
including during quiet times, which suggests that structural factors are likely driving this 
outcome (see Borio et al., 2016 for a detailed discussion). This outcome calls into question 
the use of CCS rates to proxy for liquidity frictions.
Together with funding liquidity, or the ability to meet financial obligations, analysis 
of the easiness to trade securities, or market liquidity, is also relevant for central banks. For 
29  For further analysis on this set of indicators, see Box 1.1 of the Banco de España Financial Stability Report, May 2018, 
entitled “Stock-market valuation metrics”.
30  For instance, in 2015 the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) introduced the Liquidity Coverage Ratio 
(LCR), which requires banks to store liquid assets on their balance sheets to withstand periods of distress in funding 
markets (BCBS, 2013).
31   For instance, borrowing dollars directly in the cash market should be financially equivalent to 1) borrowing euro and 2) 
entering a CCS to obtain dollars, taking into account interest rate differentials in the two currencies. However and since 
the financial crisis, borrowing in dollars has become more costly in certain CCS contracts. See Baba et al. (2009) for 
further insights into the interpretation of the CCS.
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instance, the IMF (2015) pointed to the presence of fragile liquidity conditions in a number 
of markets, including the U.S. Treasury market, after some short-lived episodes of illiquidity 
spikes such as the well-known flash event of October 2014. Thus, market illiquidity may 
pose new risks to financial stability. This is because the gradual build-up of liquidity buffers 
since the financial crisis, in part driven by regulatory initiatives such as the LCR, may be of 
little use if these assets cannot be converted into cash during bouts of market turbulence, 
when liquidity is most needed. Against this backdrop, there are some analytical approaches 
that analyse the resilience of market liquidity (for instance, Broto and Lamas, 2020), which 
may help authorities understand the complex nature of liquidity risks and strengthen their 
monitoring capacity.
2.5 Banks: profitability and solvency
Regarding the banking sector, the Banco de España regularly analyses commonly used 
indicators to evaluate their profitability and solvency. The former metric reflects the ability 
of a financial institution to generate return, whereas the latter refers to the ability to meet its 
financial obligations. The main measures to evaluate bank profitability are financial ratios, 
such as the return on equity (ROE) and the return on assets (ROA), which measure profit 
earned in relation to the level of capital and assets, respectively. The ROA quantifies how 
well the total funds invested in the bank are used to generate income and, contrary to the 
ROE, it is not affected directly by leverage. Net interest income, which is the difference 
between interest received for assets and interest paid on liabilities, is also a complementary 
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The Banco de España analyses liquidity and funding risks through indicators based on prices. Interbank interest rate spreads, such as 
EURIBOR - OIS, indicate potential stress in funding liquidity and in fixed-income markets. Additionally, EUR/USD Cross Currency Basis Swap 








1998 2001 2004 2007 2010 2013 2016 2019
%












































2  CCS EUR/USD 3M (a)
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 29 DOCUMENTO OCASIONAL N.º 2125
either total, Tier 1 or Core Equity Tier 1 (CET1) capital in the numerator relative to their risk-
weighted assets – are the most frequently used measures (see left-hand panel of Chart 11). 
An adequate level of capital would preserve banks’ capacity to absorb losses.32 
Although these traditional indicators are regularly used, central banks also 
complement this regular analysis with model-based tools to ascertain banks’ health. 
For instance, the Banco de España has developed a model to analyse the probability of 
occurrence of banking crises using bank-level data. This model complements the signals 
provided by the aggregate macrofinancial indicators. The model is a conditional logit that 
incorporates variables from the six categories defined in the international banking rating 
system known as CAMELS. CAMELS is the acronym for capital, assets, management, 
earnings, liquidity and sensitivity to the macroeconomic environment, so that the whole 
32  Market-based measures, such as bank CDS spreads, are also alternative tools to analyse the health of the banking 
sector. In the case of bank CDS spreads, Hammoudeh et al. (2013) find that the banking sector plays a CDS price-
leading role compared to the CDS spreads for financial services and insurance sectors in the US.
BANKS: PROFITABILITY AND SOLVENCY
Chart 11
SOURCE: Banco de España. Own elaboration.
a Percentage of total risk-weighted assets.
b The indicator is the sum of the probabilities of risk events in a two-year horizon of each individual bank weighted by its total assets. The probability 
is estimated through a conditional logit model where the dependent variable is an indicator of a bank experiencing a risk event in the following two 
years, where a risk event is defined as either default, public intervention or recapitalisation of the bank, absorption by another institution or capital 
needs derived from stress-testing exercises. The explanatory variables are those derived from the CAMELS-based rating system, which include 
bank characteristics associated with capital, size, management, earnings and liquidity; and macrofinancial variables (GDP growth and change in 
interest rates). The sample includes 82 banking institutions with quarterly data from 2000 Q1 to 2021 Q1. The indicator is an aggregate measure, 
so it considers the overall default probability and not individual ones, which is why it seemed not to increase before the 2017-2018 crisis, caused 
by the bankruptcies of Evo Banco and Popular.
Banks' solvency is analysed through capital-based ratios, whereas profitability is usually assessed through ratios, such as the return on equity 
(ROE) and the return on assets (ROA). The Banco de España further complements its regular analysis of banks with model-based indicators 
such as CREWS (CAMELS rating-based early-warning system), which measures the portion of bank assets that are expected to be in a 
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set of variables reflects an institution’s risk. This type of model has shown a high predictive 
capacity of banking failures in the past (Thomson, 1991; Erdogan, 2008). In particular, the 
model implemented by the Banco de España estimates the probability of a bank entering 
into a situation of distress, defined as public interventions or capitalisations, absorptions, or 
the need to raise capital as signalled by stress testing exercises, over a two-year horizon. 
Results are aggregated, accounting for the size of the banks, into a CAMELS rating-based 
early-warning system (CREWS) indicator of risk of the banking sector (see right-hand panel 
of Chart 11). This indicator demonstrated a high predictive performance before the last 
financial crisis. Recently, as a consequence of the COVID-19 pandemic, the indicator has 
risen suddenly, but has subsequently decreased in line with the improved macrofinancial 
environment.
The Banco de España also analyses the health of financial entities by means of 
stress tests. Faced with the uncertainty posed by the current health crisis over the future 
performance of the economy, the analysis of Spanish banks by means of stress tests is 
especially important, given the forward-looking nature of these tools.33
33  The methodology used by the Banco de España’s stress tests, known by the acronym FLESB (Forward-Looking 
Exercise on Spanish Banks), is applied to a 3-year horizon to measure Spanish banks’ resilience in terms of solvency 
and liquidity. The Banco de España designed FLESB using a top-down approach, under which a set of models 
developed internally are applied to the information available from regulatory and supervisory reports. For further details, 
see the Financial Stability Report of the Banco de España (Autumn 2020).
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3 Systemic risk
Following the work by the IMF, FSB and BIS for the G20 (2009), systemic risk can be defined 
as “a risk of disruption to financial services that is caused by an impairment of all or parts 
of the financial system and has the potential to have serious negative consequences for the 
real economy”.
Systemic risk can be analysed either in its time dimension or in its cross-sectional 
dimension. First, the time dimension is related to the build-up of risks over time and the 
pro-cyclical accumulation of financial vulnerabilities. Identifying it is addressed with 
indicators with different degrees of complexity. Thus, they run from data-based tools, such 
as heatmaps or financial stress indices, to more sophisticated model-driven indicators, 
such as the conditional capital shortfall-based measures. Second, the structural (or cross-
sectional) dimension of systemic risk focuses on how a specific shock to the financial 
system can propagate and become systemic. Both dimensions are critical, as financial 
stability cannot be guaranteed simply by assessing the health of individual institutions; 
continuous evaluation of the system as a whole is needed. The cross-sectional dimension 
is often analysed by means of the level of interconnectedness of the financial system, which 
is useful for disentangling contagion risks, or asset commonalities. Systemically important 
financial institutions are another relevant aspect of cross-sectional systemic risk. Finally, we 
will also analyse indicators that capture both systemic risk dimensions and other sources of 
systemic risk, such as climate change or cyber risks, whose analysis is less developed but 
whose importance has recently increased.
3.1 Systemic risk: time dimension
3.1.1 Heatmaps
Heatmaps are a useful visual tool to issue early warnings about potential systemic risks 
which merit in-depth analysis. This instrument consists of two-dimensional tables that draw 
together information on a wide range of indicators by means of a colour code linked to 
their current position on the percentile scale of their corresponding frequency distributions. 
Colour codes tend to range from red to green, the former being associated with higher 
risks and the latter with a normal range of values. For the sake of simplification, individual 
indicators are usually aggregated into categories, so that the final output represents the risk 
of each category. 
Given their simplicity and straightforward interpretation, heatmaps are broadly used 
by central banks and other institutions to monitor risks. Among others, for instance, the IMF 
regularly monitors in its Global Financial Stability Report (GFSR) a broad set of indicators in 
a matrix by type of macrofinancial imbalance across types of lenders and borrowers (Adrian 
et al., 2019b). The BIS has also developed a framework for Global Risk Surveillance for both 
advanced and emerging economies. Despite this widespread use of heatmaps, they are 
simply a graphical representation of the data. Therefore, they should always be reinforced 
by expert judgement and complemented by more sophisticated models.
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The Banco de España also relies on heatmaps to identify potential systemic risks. 
For example, Alonso and Molina (2021) develop a vulnerability dashboard that focuses on 27 
emerging market economies (EMEs) whose situation may pose a threat to financial stability 
in Spain. This dashboard includes 34 indicators related to financial markets, macroeconomic 
fundamentals – including macro, fiscal, banking and external variables – and other institutional 
and political indicators dating from 1993. The main novelty of this heatmap is that risk levels 
associated with indicators are based not only on the historical frequency distribution, but 
also on the cross-sectional one. The cross-country perspective tends to signal the countries 
that may be more exposed to global turbulence, while the historical perspective focuses on 
crises arising from more idiosyncratic factors. Thus, the combination of both dimensions 
enriches the vulnerability analysis.
Furthermore, the Banco de España regularly updates a heatmap that issues alerts 
on systemic risks from the Spanish banking system (Mencía and Saurina, 2016). This tool 
summarises information dating back to 1971 for more than 100 indicators that are regularly 
revised and extended when deemed appropriate.34 For the sake of simplicity, indicators 
are aggregated into six broad groups.35 The highest level of aggregation includes: 1) credit 
growth and leverage, 2) transformation of maturity and market illiquidity, 3) concentration, 
4) incentives and moral hazard, 5) macroeconomic imbalances, and 6) actual conditions in 
the economy and in the banking sector. While the first four categories correspond to the 
ESRB’s intermediate objectives,36 the last group does not include early-warning indicators, 
but rather variables that assess the position of the economy, which is key to adjusting the 
macroprudential policy stance.
3.1.2 Financial stress indices
A financial stress index (FSI) is a real-time measure of systemic risk that summarises high-
frequency financial data, usually daily or weekly, from different segments to proxy the 
current state of uncertainty of a specific financial system in a single number. FSIs could be 
interpreted as an ex-post measure of systemic risk, i.e. they are useful for analysing risks 
once a systemic event has already materialised. In other words, an FSI is not a leading 
indicator of recessions, as it summarises the volatility and turbulence of financial variables.
While there are many methodological proposals to calculate FSIs,37 the approach 
proposed by Holló et al. (2012) in their composite indicator of systemic stress (CISS) is 
broadly used among central banks. This method is based on two steps. Thus, once the raw 
34  There are two types of indicators: some indicators are one-tailed, so that higher vulnerability is signalled by an increase, 
whereas other indicators are two-tailed, since either an increase or a decrease signal higher risk. The non-performing 
loans ratio is an example of a one-tailed indicator, whereas the rate of change of credit is an example of a two-tailed 
indicator.
35  The aggregation is done linearly, taking into account both early-warning capacity and correlation. A higher weight is 
assigned to indicators with greater predictive power while higher correlated indicators are assigned a lower weight so 
as not to double-count the same source of risk.
36   See  recommendation of  the ESRB of 4 April 2013 on  intermediate objectives and  instruments of macroprudential 
policy (ESRB/2013/1).
37  See, for instance, Cardarelli et al. (2011) or Balakrishnan et al. (2009).
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financial market individual indicators are transformed by means of order statistics to make 
them homogeneous, these new indicators are aggregated taking into account the cross-
correlations between individual variables. Thus, FSIs set greater store by situations in which 
stress predominates in several market segments at the same time. 
Currently, the Banco de España regularly calculates FSIs following the 
aforementioned method by Holló et al. (2012) for two purposes. First, the systemic risk 
indicator (SRI) for the Spanish financial system is regularly updated.38 This indicator 
draws together information on the money market, government debt, equity and financial 
intermediaries segments.39 Besides, FSIs are also calculated for the usual assessment of 
the financial markets of all countries material to the Spanish banking sector (namely Brazil, 
Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Turkey, the US and the UK)40 except Peru, and also for Russia 
38   For a detailed explanation of this indicator, see Box 1.1 of the May 2013 Financial Stability Report of the Banco de España.
39   See Cambón and Estévez (2016) for an alternative proposal of FSI for the Spanish financial system. This indicator is 
regularly updated by the CNMV (National Securities Market Commission).
40  For the annual update of the list of material third countries by the Banco de España, see https://www.bde.
es/bde/en/areas/estabilidad/herramientas-macroprudenciales/colchon-de-capital-anticiclico/fijacion_del_po_
abd79f06544b261.html.
TIME DIMENSION OF SYSTEMIC RISK: FINANCIAL STRESS INDICES
Chart 12
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a The indicator measures the current status and the frictions in the financial markets that can potentially impact the real economy. It gathers information 
on the main segments of the financial system (government debt, equity, financial intermediaries and money markets) and provides a single value that 
reflects financial instability.
b The index captures the stress of each financial market using 3 standardised variables for 6 segments (equity, public and corporate debt, money 
markets, banks, exchange rates and commodities), giving more weight to those situations in which stress predominates in several markets at the 
same time.
Financial stress indices (FSIs) are useful for analysing risks once a systemic event has already materialised. For instance, at the onset of the 
pandemic, the Systemic Risk Indicator (SRI) for the Spanish financial system rebounded. Subsequently, this indicator gradually declined and 
currently shows levels close to those prior to the pandemic. Similarly, the FSIs have reached new highs since the Global Financial Crisis in 
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(see Andrés et al., forthcoming). For each country, the FSI summarises the information of 
six market segments (equity, public and private debt, banks, money markets, exchange rate 
markets and commodity prices) with three individual indicators for each segment. Chart 12 
illustrates the recent evolution of the SRI and the FSIs for Brazil and Mexico. These indices 
are bounded between zero (no financial stress) and one (maximum level of financial stress). 
At the onset of the pandemic in 2020, all FSIs rebounded and gradually declined afterwards.
3.1.3 Credit-to-GDP gap
The credit-to-GDP gap calculated following the recommendations of the Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision (BCBS) is the reference indicator to set the Countercyclical Capital Buffer 
(CCyB) rate. The methodology is based on the estimation of the long-run trend component of the 
credit-to-GDP ratio using a Hodrick-Prescott filter, where deviations from the estimated trend 
represent the gap. Although this indicator had proven to have good early-warning properties of 
systemic crises before the last global financial crisis (Drehmann et al., 2010; Detken et al., 2014), 
the high persistence of its trend component produces large biases after rapid changes either 
in credit or GDP. To resolve these limitations, the Banco de España has adjusted the indicator, 
significantly reducing the memory of the trend component by adapting it to the empirical 
evidence on the duration of financial cycles in Spain. This adjustment, proposed by Galán 
(2019), lessens the biases before and after crises and significantly improves the systemic event 
predictive performance. The adjusted credit-to-GDP gap is regularly updated and is the main 
indicator to support the quarterly decisions on the CCyB (see Chart 13). This indicator recorded 
highly negative values following the global financial crisis, holding on a rising path thereafter 
consistently below 2 pp, a level usually considered as showing signs of imbalances. After the 
outbreak of the pandemic, and more specifically since June 2020, this indicator has remained 
above the alert threshold. However, this is due to the stimulus policies and the sharp impact of 
the shock triggered by COVID-19 on GDP rather than to new endogenous imbalances of the 
financial system which could be handled by the activation of the CCyB. 
To compensate for the limitations of the credit-to-GDP gap in the current juncture 
and substantiate its analysis of the cyclical risk position, the Banco de España also takes into 
account other complementary macro-financial indicators. More specifically, the output gap 
has gained relevance when it comes to supporting CCyB decisions. As Chart 13 shows, the 
output gap remains at strongly negative levels, which suggests an unprecedented impact of 
the pandemic on economic activity.
3.1.4 Conditional capital shortfall-based measures of systemic risk
Since the Great Financial Crisis (GFC), the literature on market-based metrics to gauge 
systemic risk has significantly increased (for more information on this topic see Bisias et al. 
(2012) or Sylvain et al. (2016)). One of the most salient groups of indicators in this area requires 
the calculation of the expected capital shortfall of individual institutions, i.e. the capital that a 
financial institution would need under stressed conditions. The rationale is that undercapitalised 
institutions will no longer supply credit for ordinary business, and thus, this lack of lending 
would generate a negative externality for the overall financial system and the real economy. 
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 35 DOCUMENTO OCASIONAL N.º 2125
Along these lines, Adrian and Brunnermeier (2016) propose a conditional Value-
at-Risk (CoVaR) measure, which captures the change in the Value-at-Risk of the financial 
system conditional upon an institution being under stress, relative to the Value-at-Risk 
conditional upon that institution being at its median state. In other words, CoVaR measures 
the contribution of a financial institution to systemic risk. Similarly, but based on a different 
methodology, Acharya et al. (2010) suggest a Marginal Expected Shortfall (MES) measure 
that estimates the expected drop in the stock returns conditional upon a poor performance 
of the overall system. Finally, Brownlees and Engle (2017) introduce the SRISK indicator, 
defined as the expected capital shortfall of a financial entity conditional upon a prolonged 
market decline. In addition and based on this last indicator, Engle and Ruan (2019) propose 
a measure of the probability of a crisis. All these measures may be calculated only for listed 
companies. 
In line with other central banks, the Banco de España also monitors listed financial 
institutions according to these metrics. For instance, Chart 14 depicts the distribution of the 
SRISK indicator for banks in the Eurozone as a percentage of the total assets of each bank. 
SYSTEMIC RISK (TIME DIMENSION): ADJUSTED CREDIT-TO-GDP GAP (a) AND OUTPUT GAP (b) (c)
Chart 13
SOURCE: Banco de España.
NOTE: Data refer to the end of 2020 Q4.
a The adjusted credit-to-GDP gap is calculated as the difference, in percentage points, between the observed ratio and the long-term trend calculated 
using a one-sided Hodrick-Prescott filter with a smoothing parameter equal to 25.000. This value is more in line with the financial cycles historically 
observed in Spain. For more details on the calculation of the adjusted credit-to-GDP gap, see Galán (2019).
b The output gap measures the difference between the actual and potential level of GDP. For further information, see Cuadrado et al. (2016).
c The shaded areas show the last period of systemic banking crisis (2009 Q1-2013 Q4) and the coronavirus pandemic (2020). The horizontal dashed 
line represents the CCyB activation threshold equal to 2 pp.
The credit-to-GDP gap is the main reference indicator for the activation of the countercyclical capital buffer. However, the great inertia of the 
trend induced by the method recommended by the BCBS generates sizable biases. The version used by the Banco de España is adjusted 
to the characteristics of the financial cycle in Spain. The indicator signals the imbalances before the last financial crisis and the recovery phase 
in recent years. Recently, the significant GDP losses derived from the COVID-19 pandemic have seen the indicator increase suddenly and 
exceed the CCyB activation threshold. Therefore, these recent developmentss should not be interpreted as a systemic risk warning and other 
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This indicator increased for most banks in March 2020 with the onset of the COVID-19 crisis, 
and subsequently declined along with the financial markets recovery.
3.2 Systemic risk: structural dimension
3.2.1 Structural risks
Structural risks are related to long-term risks of a non-cyclical nature and to risks stemming 
from structural features of the financial system or the wider economy. In this respect, the 
Systemic Risk Buffer (SRB) is a fairly flexible macroprudential instrument that aims to address 
such risks and it is part of the agenda on regulatory changes (CRR II/CRD V). Although 
the CRD IV is not quite precise regarding the indicators for the activation or the release of 
the SRB, the ESRB (2017) proposed three broad categories of structural risk indicators. (1) 
The first category comprises indicators that reflect structural characteristics of the financial 
sector, as a large domestic banking sector can give rise to systemic risk. The main indicators 
in this category are related to the size and concentration of the domestic banking sector, 
foreign ownership and other structural risks such as the levels of NPLs. (2) The second set of 
indicators adresses the propagation and amplification of shocks within the financial system. 
The amplification channels are related to structural characteristics such as the exposure to 
concentration, asset and banking business model characteristics, and interconnectedness 
SYSTEMIC RISK (TIME DIMENSION): CONDITIONAL CAPITAL SHORTFALL-BASED MEASURES
Chart 14
SOURCE: Datastream, SNL, INE and Banco de España.
a The SRISK indicator is expressed as a percentage of the total assets of each entity. Parameter assumptions are 4.5% for the capital requirement, 
10% for the market drop and 22 business days for the period in which the potential market drop takes place [see Brownlees and Engle (2017) for 
further details]. Given data unavailability, the index as of December 2020 is calculated for most banks with asset and liability values as of 2020 Q3. 
Percentile series have been smoothed using a 3-month moving average.
The SRISK indicator approximates the expected capital shortfall of a bank after a substantial drop in equity markets. This figure represents the 
distribution of the SRISK indicator as a percentage of the total assets of each bank for listed companies in the eurozone. This indicator increased 
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and intra-financial linkages, including the importance of non-bank financials. Regarding non-
banks, although they offer broader-based funding to the economy, they may also become 
a source of systemic risk if they become involved in activities typically performed by banks, 
but without being subject to banking regulatory and supervisory standards. Therefore, 
international and national authorities use risk metrics to monitor these activities (such as 
credit intermediation, maturity or liquidity transformation and the creation of leverage) 
performed by non-banks. (3) The third group of indicators is related to structural risks to 
the banking sector stemming from the real economy. As the GFC demonstrated, shocks 
originating from the real economy can lead to significant losses for the financial sector, and 
reduce the banking credit available, which in turn would have an additional negative impact 
on the real economy. Such risks could be triggered by specific vulnerable economic sectors 
or, in the case of small open economies, by a crisis in a different country.
The regular monitoring of structural risks enables the early detection of vulnerabilities 
that may lead to a crisis. This is an area to be developed in the future in parallel with that of 
regulation. Various international organisations such as the Financial Stability Board (FSB)41 
and the ESRB have worked in this area. For instance, the ESRB quarterly dashboard of 
systemic risks includes structural indicators, among others.42 Other national authorities have 
further developed their analysis of structural indicators. For instance, the Suomen Pankki 
regularly updates a set of structural indicators that compares Finnish variables with the EU 
in a dashboard,43 and the Norges Bank has recently proposed a set of indicators to assess 
the Norwegian SRB.44
3.2.2 Interconnectedness among banks based on network analysis
As mentioned, systemic risk depends, among other factors, on the network of financial 
exposures among financial institutions, such as banks.45 This kind of analysis is important 
since, in a strongly connected network of institutions, even a small shock can become 
systemic. Shock propagation in interbank markets can occur through multiple channels 
and market segments. Network models provide a flexible approach for assessing potential 
system-wide losses due to interconnectedness among banks. Nevertheless, this type of 
analysis requires granular data on financial networks that is often lacking, being one of the 
main challenges of this approach.
Although there is no consensus on the methodology to address this issue, research 
in this field is growing rapidly. Inspired by the seminal paper by Eisenberg and Noe (2001), a 
number of initial contributions focused on the assessment of the likelihood and the extent of 






45  See Aymanns et al. (2018), Glasserman and Young (2016) and Caccioli et al. (2018) for some recent surveys on 
network analysis.
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has been considered, such as short-term liquidity withdrawal (Hałaj, 2020), overlapping 
portfolios and fire sales (Cifuentes et al., 2005), or credit quality deterioration (Battiston et 
al., 2012, and Bardoscia et al., 2015).46 Importantly, most of these channels allow for the 
contagion of financial distress even before the materialisation of a default. 
Among recent works with relevant policy implications, Roncoroni et al. (2019) 
study possible contagion channels for banks in the Euro Area through direct or indirect 
exposures, and Caceres-Santos et al. (2020) look at systemic risk and interconnectedness 
in the Bolivian banking system. Other empirical exercises use similar methods to model 
contagion in the interbank market. For instance, Fink et al. (2016) propose a method which 
analyses shock transmission via changes in the PD of borrowers due to changes in their 
capital ratio. Besides, Aldasoro et al. (2020) analyse outcomes based on a fixed matrix of 
interbank exposures to total exposures and consider shocks to stem from changes in the 
value of total assets. All in all, this strand of the literature highlights the multiple applications 
of network-based analyses within central banks’ risk monitoring activities. 
3.2.3 Interconnectedness across financial sectors: direct and indirect interconnectedness
Interconnectedness between financial institutions – banks and other financial agents – is an 
inherent characteristic of developed financial systems that allows for risk-sharing between 
agents and facilitates the provision of and access to finance. However, at times of crisis/
stress, it may also contribute to the propagation of shocks across the financial system. The 
Banco de España regularly updates its assessment of the links within the Spanish financial 
system (and between its institutions and foreign entities) in its Financial Stability Report (see 
Alonso and Stupariu, 2019). This analysis tends to focus on Spanish banks’ interconnections 
and distinguishes between direct and indirect interconnectedness.
First, direct interconnectedness arises from counterparty relationships and 
exposures, whether on the asset or the liability side (examples would be direct borrowing/
lending or investment exposures between two counterparties). Thus, these connections 
materialise where two entities are direct counterparties through debt instruments, shares 
or other contractual relationships. In general, analysis of these interlinkages focuses 
on cross-holdings: loans and issuances by one financial institution and held by another 
belonging to the same or a different financial sector. The most common indicator of direct 
interconnectedness is based on the volume of exposures that entities in each sector hold 
with others. To understand the significance of this volume, the ratios of the exposures or 
liabilities of the analysed sector to other sectors over the amount of total assets of that 
sector are monitored. These indicators are also used for cross-border exposures (exposures 
to the Rest of the World). Chart 15 illustrates direct interlinkages between sectors by means 
of the share of Spanish banks’ financial assets corresponding to their exposures (assets and 
liabilities) to other sectors. This type of indicator is also used by institutions such as the FSB, 
46  The DebtRank algorithm by Battiston et al. (2012) and Bardoscia et al. (2015) is a broadly extended approach to model 
the transmission of shocks by means of the credit quality channel.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 39 DOCUMENTO OCASIONAL N.º 2125
the ESRB and the ECB to quantify direct exposures in their regular monitoring exercises of 
the financial system.47
Second, indirect interconnectedness occurs, for example, when financial institutions 
hold common exposures to certain sectors, markets or instruments. One of the risks 
stemming from these interlinkages is related to fire sales in one sector potentially leading 
to declines in asset prices that could affect the balance sheets of other institutions. Other 
types of links can also be considered when analysing indirect interconnectedness such as 
participation in collateral chains, affiliation to the same corporate groups, or exposure to 
reputational risk owing to financial support provided to subsidiaries or similar entities other 
than contractual relationships (step-in risk). 
There are two types of indicators that are commonly used to quantify indirect 
interconnectedness.48 The first consists of the assessment of the portfolio overlap, i.e. 
the common securities held by any pair of sectors in their portfolios. Indicators show 
the volume of holdings that a sector has in its securities portfolio that are also held by 
47  See, for instance, Grillet-Aubert et al. (2016), ECB (2020b) or FSB and ESRB annual reports such as FSB (2020a) and 
ESRB (2020b).
48  See ECB (2018) and Banco de España (2021) for two examples of indirect interconnectedness analysis of these 
indicators.
SYSTEMIC RISK (CROSS-SECTIONAL DIMENSION): INTERCONNECTEDNESS BETWEEN FINANCIAL SECTORS
Chart 15
SOURCE: Financial Accounts of the Spanish Economy - Banco de España.
NOTE: All data refer to the end of 2020 Q4.
a The OFI (Other Financial Institutions) category comprises several sectors in the Financial Accounts: Other Financial Intermediaries, specialised lending 
institutions and investment funds (money market and non-money market funds).
Banks’ direct interconnectedness with other sectors accounts for a relatively small share (in no case more than 5% of banks’ financial assets). 
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other sectors (the analysis is granular and reflects the overlap on a security-by-security 
basis, or on an issuer basis). These figures can also be presented as percentages of the 
total sector portfolios. The second indicator is the portfolio correlation coefficient of the 
holdings of each sector pair on each date. This measure quantifies the extent of similarity 
of the distribution of the securities in the portfolios. This measure does not depend on 
portfolio size and, therefore, is not affected by the differences in total volume of each 
sector’s holdings.
3.3 Other sources of systemic risk
3.3.1 Climate change
Climate Change (CC) is part of the environmental component of the environmental, 
social and governance (ESG) factors relevant for the assessment of the sustainability 
of economic and financial activities. CC risks include physical risks and transition risks. 
Whereas physical risks stem from the CC process itself,49 transition risks arise from the 
actions taken by the economic agents to adapt and mitigate the effects of CC. Such 
mitigating actions, which are based on different global warming scenarios, include the 
adoption by public authorities of measures such as carbon taxes, the implementation 
of stricter CO2 (and equivalent) emissions targets, and other factors such as changes 
in consumer behavior or the implementation of technological improvements that could 
affect energy production and efficiency. Importantly, although most CC risks materialise 
in some of the risks analysed previously (credit, market, operational, etc.), they are a 
source of (emerging) financial risk to the economy for their potential effect on financial 
stability and its systemic implications (ECB and ESRB, 2020). Therefore, ensuring that 
the financial system is resilient to these risks falls within the mandate of central banks 
and supervisors (NGFS, 2019).
Climate-related risks can be classified in the traditional standard risk categories. 
Although credit risk has attracted the biggest analytical effort, market, liquidity, operational 
and even reputational risk might also become material. However, the measurement of CC-
related financial risks entails serious limitations (BIS, 2021). The main drawback is the lack of 
comparable and reliable climate-related data to quantify the potential impact of physical and 
transition risks. Although there are several initiatives to improve available information,50 the 
lack of harmonised definitions, metrics, disclosures and granular information (firm-level data 
rather than industry averages), and the fact that historical data might not provide an accurate 
estimation of forward-looking risks along with no previous experience of structural breaks 
of this nature, make the analysis highly challenging. Besides, in the realm of physical risks, 
additional complexity arises from the need to integrate output from global climate models 
with detailed regional/spatial information regarding the location of economic activities and 
49  Physical risks are linked to the possibility of material losses in the value of assets of economic agents or value-chain 
disruptions as a result of, for example, a significant rise in the sea level, drought, floods or the increase in the severity 
of meteorological phenomena.
50  For instance, the FSB is currently working on data availability (FSB, 2020b). In parallel, the “bridging the data gaps” 
NGFS workstream also deals with the identification of the data items that are currently lacking.
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the nature of production processes to achieve informative estimates as to the potential 
impact of this risk.51
This lack of proper data hinders the development of appropriate indicators to analyse 
how climate risks feed into the financial risks faced by economic agents, including banks. Also, 
reliable data scarcity limits research on the measurement of climate financial risks. For instance, 
Delgado (2019) is one of the few papers that attempts to quantify energy transition risks in 
Spain despite these data limitations. This work concludes that the banking system’s exposures 
to risks affected by the energy transition make up around 25% of the portfolio of loans for 
productive activities. In this context, many supervisory and/or prudential authorities are opting 
to use stress tests and scenario analysis.52 For instance, the Banco de España has developed 
macroeconomic scenarios to assess the consequences of CC (see Aguilar et al., 2021).53
The development of an adequate framework to improve data quality and the 
analysis of climate-related risks also requires a broader perspective. There are gaps 
related to climate risks in areas that cover regulatory, supervisory and disclosure elements. 
Regarding regulatory and supervisory matters, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
(BCBS) task force on climate-related financial risks (TFCR)54 will, in addition to laying down 
a set of principles or guidelines on effective supervisory practices for assessing climate-
related financial risks, explore whether any policy measures under the regulatory framework 
should be taken. At the EU level, prudential regulation (CRR and CRD) mandates55 the 
European Banking Authority (EBA) to assess the potential inclusion of ESG risks in the 
supervisory review and evaluation process (Pillar 2) and to evaluate whether a dedicated 
prudential treatment of exposures related to assets or activities associated substantially 
with environmental and social objectives would be justified (Pillar 1). Partly due to the close 
deadlines for the completion of some of the EBA’s work and to acknowledge EBA’s Action 
Plan on Sustainable Finance, several European supervisors, the Banco de España included 
(Banco de España, 2020), have already issued supervisory expectations (see, for instance, 
ECB, 2020c). The purpose of these supervisory expectations is to encourage entities to 
start taking into account CC risks and to be more prepared for possible future regulatory 
requirements in this area.
Finally, climate-related disclosure requirements could decisively contribute to the 
correct pricing of climate-related risks by financial markets. To date, disclosure is still at 
51   In addition to the  lack of data,  relevant scientific knowledge  is needed to properly make use of historical data and 
forward-looking projections when carrying out a financial risk assessment (see, for instance, Fiedler at al., 2021; IPCC, 
2012). Besides,  the quantification of CC  risks also suffers  from additional problems as  traditional models may not 
accurately describe relevant phenomena at a more granular level.
52  See Regelink (2017), Banque de France and ACPR (2017), Bank of England (2018), Danmarks Nationalbank (2020) 
and Van Tendeloo (2020) for further examples of works by central banks that quantify the impact of CC risks. Also, ECB 
Banking Supervision will carry out a separate supervisory climate stress test of individual banks in 2022.
53  Vermeulen (2018), ECB and ESRB (2020c) and Banque de France and ACPR (2021) are examples of further stress 
test exercises.
54  The BCBS will undertake further work in three broad areas: regulatory, supervisory and disclosure-related elements for 
the banking system. For more details, see Pablo Hernández de Cos’s remarks – Panel “What are the policies currently 
considered by central banks, regulators and supervisors – and their challenges – to address climate change?” (2021).
55  See article 98.8 CRD for Pillar 2 mandate and article 501 quarter CRR for Pillar 1.
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an early stage and faces several limitations. Indeed, targets are not always supported by 
the relevant metrics, making it difficult to assess the performance of the institution against 
them. In this respect, there are several ongoing initiatives. For instance, the Network of 
Central Banks and Supervisors for Greening the Financial System (NGFS), a global initiative 
among central banks, has encouraged all non-financial corporations that issue debt or 
equity, along with financial sector institutions, to disclose in line with the recommendations 
of the Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures (TCFD).56 While compliance with 
TCFD recommendations is gaining traction, it is still very heterogeneous between institutions 
(Moreno and Caminero, 2020).57 Also, the BIS Innovation Hub (BISIH) has a working group 
dedicated to looking into how interaction with technologies such as artificial intelligence, 
the internet of things (IOT) and blockchain can help green finance, given the importance 
of measurement and disclosure for new sustainability-linked products to emerge and for 
carbon trading markets to scale up.
At the European level, there are several initiatives under way. Among others, (1) since 
2018 the Directive 2014/95/EU, also called the Non-Financial Reporting Directive (NFRD), 
which modified the Accounting Directive 2013/34/EU, has obliged certain business groups 
and large companies to include a non-financial statement as part of their annual public 
reporting obligations.58 (2) Significantly, in April 2021, the European Commission adopted a 
proposal for a Corporate Sustainability Reporting Directive (CSRD), which would amend the 
existing reporting requirements under the NFRD, making them more consistent with other 
pieces of the EU legal framework, including the Sustainable Finance Disclosure Regulation 
(SFDR)59 and the Taxonomy Regulation.60 (3) In addition, in March 2021, International 
Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) Foundation Trustees announced the formation of 
a new Sustainability Standards Board that will contribute to accelerating convergence 
in sustainability reporting standards at a global level.61 (4) Finally, the EBA has recently 
published a consultation paper on draft implementing technical standards (ITS) on Pillar 3 
disclosures on Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG) risks (EBA, 2021). Among other 
requirements, the draft ITS put forward comparable quantitative disclosures on climate-
change related transition and physical risks. The EBA has also integrated proportionality 




of investors, consumers and society. This Directive is expected to be revised and its revision could be an opportunity 
to increase the coverage, comparability and consistency of the climate risk-related data.
59  The proposal for a CSRD is aimed at extending the scope of application to all large companies and all companies listed 
on regulated markets, requiring assurance of reported information, introducing a requirement to report according to 
mandatory EU sustainability reporting standards and requiring companies to digitally ‘tag’ the reported information, 
to make it machine-readable and able to feed into the European Single Access Point (ESAP) envisaged in the capital 
markets union action plan.
60   The EU taxonomy is a classification system to list environmentally sustainable economic activities and sets out four 
overarching conditions that any economic activity has to meet to qualify as environmentally sustainable. For further 
information, see Regulation (EU) 2020/852 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 June 2020 on the 
establishment of a framework to facilitate sustainable investment.
61  This initiative will contribute to the efforts of already-established initiatives including the Global Reporting Initiative 
(GRI), the International Integrated Reporting Council (IIRC), the Sustainability Accounting Standards Board (SASB), the 
Climate Disclosure Standards Board (CDSB) and the CDP (formerly the Carbon Disclosure Project).
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measures that should facilitate institutions’ disclosures, including transitional periods 
where disclosures in terms of estimates and proxies are allowed. Finally, the EBA has also 
recommended to the European Commission62 the use of the green asset ratio (GRA), which 
is aimed at identifying and disclosing the institutions’ assets financing activities that are 
environmentally sustainable according to the EU taxonomy, such as those consistent with 
the European Green Deal and the Paris agreement goals. 
3.3.2 Operational risks
The meaning of such risks is not straightforward but, according to BCBS (2011), operational 
risk could be defined as the “risk of losses resulting from inadequate or failed internal 
processes, people and systems, or external events”.
Among operational risks it is worth highlighting cyber-risks. Over the last decades 
the global financial system has become more digitalised and interconnected and, 
consequently, it increasingly relies critically on robust information and communications 
technology (ICT) infrastructures. Against this background, many stakeholders see cyber 
and IT-related risks in the form of cyber-incidents as a prominent threat to the financial 
system. Indeed, cyber-attacks on financial institutions and financial market infrastructures 
are becoming more frequent and sophisticated. The risk that an isolated cyber-attack could 
have consequences for the entire financial system is known as systemic cyber-risk.63 In this 
respect, in 2020 the European Systemic Cyber Group (ESCG), which reports to the ESRB, 
developed a conceptual model for systemic cyber-risk to assess how it may become a 
source of systemic risk to the financial system through operational, confidence and financial 
contagion channels (see ESRB, 2020a, and Ros, 2020 for details).
In most jurisdictions, cyber-risk management practices are quite mature and are 
used to address cyber-risk and supervise cyber-resilience. Those approaches have focused 
on reported incidents, surveys, penetration tests and on-site inspections. Regrettably, to 
date there are no quantitative metrics or risk indicators to identify cyber-risks. This makes it 
very difficult for financial institutions and supervisors to quantify cyber-risks so as to engage 
in cyber-resilience.
Despite this lack of a quantitative metric, there are several initiatives that attempt 
to address this problem. For instance, the EBA guidelines on ICT risk assessment (EBA, 
2017) are intended to promote common procedures and methodologies among competent 
authorities for the assessment of the ICT risk under the supervisory review and evaluation 
process (SREP). In light of these guidelines, the ECB, together with the national competent 
authorities, developed the IT Risk Questionnaire as part of a dedicated SREP IT risk 
62   See EBA (2021) Advice to the Commission on disclosures under article 8 taxonomy regulation (EBA/Op/2021/03).
63   More specifically, the World Economic Forum (WEF) defined systemic cyber-risk as “the risk that a cyber event (attack(s) 
or  other  adverse  event(s))  at  an  individual  component  of  a  critical  infrastructure  ecosystem  will  cause  significant 
delay, denial, breakdown, disruption or loss, such that services are impacted not only in the originating component 
but consequences also cascade into related (logically and/or geographically) ecosystem components, resulting in 
significant adverse effects to public health or safety, economic security or national security.” See WEF (2016).
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assessment methodology for significantly important financial institutions in the Euro Area. 
This tool allows supervisors to collect information on the IT-risk level and on the IT-risk 
control maturity of significant institutions at individual level. The IT Risk Questionnaire is 
structured according to the five IT risk categories defined by the EBA: IT security risk, IT 
availability and continuity risk, IT change risk, IT outsourcing risk and IT data integrity risk, 
and contains some backward-looking indicators without predictive capacity that inform on 
the broad adequacy of an institution´s cyber-resilience levels for its business needs and risk 
appetite. However, no single indicator can be considered as a sufficient metric to identify ITC 
risks, and no standard set of indicators has been identified so far to provide a meaningful 
benchmark either. ECB Banking Supervision provides feedback to the industry with the 
publication of the annual report on the outcome of SREP IT Risk Questionnaire.64 The 
report provides aggregated observations based on the horizontal analysis of the significant 
supervised institutions’ self-assessments on ICT risk, which are useful for the public and 
can point to developments in the management of IT risk aspects of the ECB-supervised 
significant credit institutions. 
Moreover, in recent years, there has been a clear tendency of institutions to 
outsource ICT services to external providers. Some services are concentrated in a small 
number of providers. Although their concentration is nothing new, the provision of services 
has changed, as there is a clear trend towards the movement to the cloud. Against this 
backdrop, the materialisation of a risk in a supplier that provides relevant services for a 
significant part of the financial sector could also have a systemic impact. To mitigate this 
risk, the European Commission has set provisions for a third-party oversight framework in 
the legislative proposal Digital Operational and Resilience Act.65 According to the proposal, 
the ESAs will designate which ICT third-party service providers are critical for the European 
financial sector.
Finally, the entry of big tech companies in the provision at scale of banking services 
could entail a major structural overhaul of the banking sector. The systemic scope of the 
behavioural reactions unleashed by such a transformation would have a broad-based impact 
on financial intermediation and the efficacy of a wide range of policies (most prominently, 
monetary and macro-prudential policies). The monitoring and policy reaction to this still-
incipient development is based on a set of ad-hoc qualitative signals, which inform about a 
deepening of the structural change at stake. Significant examples of these signals are the 
scope of products distributed in big tech platforms, and the funding models employed and 
use of non-bank originated APIs. The provision of crypto-instruments to make payments 
and/or store value (like stablecoins) by big tech companies further enhances the potential 
for systemic risks and leads to the monitoring of informative indicators such as outstanding 
balance and turnover.
64  See the Annual report on the outcome of the 2020 SREP IT Risk Questionnaire - Feedback to the industry at https://
www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/banking/srep/2021/html/ssm.srep202107_outcomesrepitriskquestionnaire.
en.html.
65  See legislative Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on digital operational resilience 
for the financial sector at https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52020PC0595.
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4 Conclusions
Based on the experience of the Banco de España, this survey presents a broad overview of 
the identification tools employed by central banks to identify standard and systemic risks. 
This paper shows that the indicators developed and used at the Banco de España allow a 
comprehensive monitoring of potential risks across categories and segments. Besides, this 
survey confirms that the instruments used at the Banco de España are in line with those 
employed by other central banks and supervisory authorities. 
Nevertheless, the maintenance of an adequate risk identification framework is not 
without its challenges and more work will be needed. For instance, the development of risk 
indicators to address climate change, both for the category of physical and transition risks, 
and those linked to the risk of system-wide cyber-incidents will merit further attention in 
the future. This latter aspect is a widespread problem across institutions that has not yet 
been addressed due to the lack of data to perform a proper analysis. Moreover, there is also 
room for improvement in the risk identification of some areas, such as structural risks. New 
regulation would allow for the adoption of new macroprudential tools in the future that would 
require further risk identification analysis. Finally, this paper does not analyse either which 
measures have the best properties as leading indicators of crises. The question is still an 
open issue for the whole set of indicators, although the predictive capacity of many of them 
has been broadly demonstrated.
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Appendix
INDICATORS TO IDENTIFY CREDIT RISK AND REAL ESTATE VULNERABILITIES
Table A.1
SOURCE: Devised by authors.
noitpircsed feirBtnemges tegraTrohtuArotacidnI
Vulnerability measures among 
indebted households
 noitcarf eht fo noitaluclac elbane sdlohesuoh no atad detagerggasiDsdlohesuoH)9102( EdB
of households that owe more than three times their gross income, or 
that devote more than 40% of their gross income to debt payments
Distributional Financial 
Accounts
Batty et al. (2019) Households Quarterly series with an estimation of the distribution of assets and 
debts across US households (Batty et al., 2019). BdE has recently 
constructed distributional financial accounts by combining data on 
macroeconomic developments with household balance sheets
Interest coverage ratio (ICR) Menéndez and Mulino (2019) Non-financial 
corporations
The ICR is an indicator of the degree of financial pressure that firms 
face. In particular, when the value of this ratio remains below one 
over a sustained period this is considered to be a sign of 
vulnerability, since it implies that the firm is not capable of paying the 
interest on its debt out of ordinary profit in a sustained fashion. 
Based on this information, indicators of the proportion of debt and 
employment associated with Spanish firms that are subject to high 
financial pressure are calculated
 laicnanif-noNEdBSACI gnitaR
corporations
Credit evaluations of Spanish companies to be used in collateral 
eligibility for monetary policy operations
 morf secirp esuoh fo snoitaived egral yfitnedi ot hcaorppa lacitsitatSetatsE laeR—secirp etatse laeR
long-term trends. Trends are obtained with Hodrick-Prescott filters 
to separate cyclical from long-run components. If prices are too high 





Real Estate Overvaluation of the housing market based on the deviation in pp of 
house prices and their long-term path estimated with an error 
correction model (ECM)
Misalignment indicator ECB (2016) Real Estate Based on a Bayesian model, it explains real house prices using real 
disposable income per household, the real housing stock per capita 
and the mortgage rate as explanatory variables
House price-at-risk (HaR) Adrian et al. (2019) Real Estate HaR measures the minimum forecast changes in real house prices 
(RHPI) in very adverse scenarios over a certain horizon. This 
methodology allows the complete distribution of future changes in 
the RHPI to be estimated
 tluafed evird hcihw ,tiderc fo scitsiretcarahc niatrec no desaBetatsE laeR—)…PTL ,VTL( sdradnats gnidneL
probabilities in the mortgage market
Loan-to-price (LTP) Bover et al. (2019), Galán 
and Lamas (2019)
Real Estate Ratio of the principal amount of the loan to the price of the house, 
which represents a material driver of defaults
Residential real estate (RRE) 
credit-at-risk index
Banco de España (2019) Real Estate A synthetic indicator that estimates the risk of new mortgage 
operations by means of a default probability model with lending 
standard indicators as explanatory variables
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INDICATORS TO IDENTIFY MACROECONOMIC RISKS
Table A.2
SOURCE: Devised by authors.
noitpircsed feirBtnemges tegraTrohtuArotacidnI
Synthetic index of the vulnerability 
of the most relevant emerging 
economies (EMEs) for Spain 
(SHERLOC)
Alonso and Molina (2019) Several A tool to detect the accumulation of risks in 25 large EMEs for three 
different types of crisis (sovereign, currency and banking crisis)
Economic Policy Uncertainty 
(EPU) index 
Baker et al. (2016) Other It measures the frequency of articles in leading newspapers that 
contain certain words related to economic uncertainty
Debt Sustainability Analysis (DSA) 
framework
Bouabdallah et al., (2017) Sovereings It measures risks to fiscal sustainability by combining a deterministic 
analysis based on the evolution of the debt-to-GDP path as a 
response to economic shocks, stochastic simulations to provide 
uncertainty around the benchmark estimates, and the use of a set of 
fiscal indicators that provide information on the sustainability of 
public finances in the short and medium run
Growth-at-risk Adrian et al. (2019) Several The forecast growth rate under an adverse scenario that occurs with 
a certain probability. It refers to the analysis of the left tail of the 
forecast GDP growth distribution
 snoitatcepxe noitalfni tekram no noitamrofni edivorp spaws noitalfnIlareveS—spaws noitalfnI
at different horizons
 ticilpmi tcartxe ot sledom lanretni sesu añapsE ed ocnaB ehTlareveS—noitalfed fo ytilibaborP
probabilities of being in a situation of deflation at different horizons
INDICATORS TO IDENTIFY MARKET, FUNDING AND LIQUIDITY RISKS
Table A.3
SOURCE: Devised by authors.
noitpircsed feirBtnemges tegraTrohtuArotacidnI
Implied volatility indices (VIX, 
VVIX, MOVE, VSTOXX…)
(Chicago Board Options 
Exchange) CBOE-VIX-based
Several These indices reflect the market expectations for the future volatility 
of the underlying asset. Their calculation is based on option prices
 ot noitaulavrevo tekram erutuf ro tnerruc fo ksir eht setaler tIlareveS—)REP( oitar sgninrae-ot-ecirP
investors' future cash flow expectations. Their dynamics incorporate 
investors' beliefs about future cash-flows, economic activity and 
growth. It denotes undervaluation or overvaluation in equity markets
Cyclically Adjusted PER (CAPE)  Campbell and Shiller (1998) Several It smooths out the standard PER using the last ten years’ average
inflation-adjusted earnings in the denominator. A priori, CAPE 
therefore offers a less distorted view of whether an index is 
overvalued, as it uses information covering expansionary phases and 
downturns rather than current data
 dnob eht revo tekram ytiuqe eht morf nruter detcepxe ssecxE lareveSEdBmuimerp ksir ytiuqe deilpmI
market.  Not directly observable
Interbank Interest rate spreads 
(Libor-OIS, Euribor-OIS, 
FRA-OIS, TED-spread)
 .rehtona eno ot dnel ot egrahc sknab aimerp ksir eht stcelfer tIknabretnI—
A wide spread means that the interbank money markets have 
become less liquid
Cross-currency basis swap (CCS) 
spreads
 ecnatsni rof( ycnerruc eno ni worrob ot tnemeerga na si SCC AstekraM—
dollars). Its spread is an indicator of tensions in the currency of the 
funding market. In the case of the EUR/USD CCS, as this spread 
increases, swapping euros for US dollars becomes increasingly 
expensive; banks with large refinancing needs in US dollars and little 
or no access to other sources of dollar funding (e.g. deposits) are 
most vulnerable to fluctuations in this spread
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INDICATORS TO IDENTIFY RISKS IN THE BANKING SECTOR
Table A.4
SOURCE: Devised by authors.
noitpircsed feirBtnemges tegraTrohtuArotacidnI
latipac fo level eht ot denrae tiforp fo oitaRsknaB—)EOR( ytiuqE no nruteR
 llew woh seifitnauq tI .stessa fo level eht ot denrae tiforp fo oitaRsknaB—)AOR( stessA no nruteR
shareholders’ funds are used to generate income and, contrary to 
the ROE, the ROA is unaffected by leverage
 no diap tseretni dna stessa rof deviecer tseretni neewteb ecnereffiDsknaB—)IIN( emocnI tseretnI teN
liabilities
 ro 1 reiT ,latot rehtie era soitar esehT .ycnevlos 'sknab fo srotacidnIsknaB—soitar latipaC
Core Equity Tier 1 (CET1) capital to risk-weighted assets
 gniknab eht ni sksir fo metsys gninraw-ylrae desab-gnitar SLEMACsknaBEdBSWERC/LEMAC
sector. The method relies on forecasts of a logit model. Explanatory 
variables: individual characteristics of banks and macroeconomic 
variables
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INDICATORS TO IDENTIFY SYSTEMIC RISK
Table A.5
SOURCE: Devised by authors.
noitpircsed feirBtnemges tegraTrohtuArotacidnI
lareveS—spamtaeH  Identification of risks for global financial stability. Some of them 
include qualitative as well as quantitative indicatos. Usually based 
on frequency distributions and tail risks
Financial stress indices (FSI): 
Composite Indicator of Systemic 
Stress (CISS)
Holló et al. (2012) Markets Aggregation of market-specific sub-indices created from individual 
financial stress measures. The aggregation takes into account the 
time-varying cross-correlations between the sub-indices. As a 
result, the CISS sets relatively greater store by situations in which 
stress prevails in several market segments at the same time, which 
captures the idea that financial stress is more systemic. The 
Systemic Risk Indicator (SRI) for the Spanish financial system 
follows this approach. FSIs are also calculated by the Banco de 
España for the usual assessment of the financial markets of almost 
all countries material to the Spanish banking sector
 ,dnert mret-gnol sti dna oitar PDG-ot-tiderc eht neewteb ecnereffiDsknaB—pag PDG-ot-tiderC
estimated using a Hodrick-Prescott filter
Conditional Value at Risk 
(CoVaR)
Adrian and Brunnermeier (2016) Banks It captures the change in the Value-at-Risk of the financial system 
conditional upon an institution being under distress, relative to the 
Value-at-Risk conditional upon that institution being at its median 
state. In other words, CoVaR measures the contribution of a 
financial institution to systemic risk
Marginal Expected Shortfall (MES) Acharya et al. (2010) Banks Measure that estimates the expected drop in the stock returns 
conditional upon a poor performance of the overall system
 ni pord laitnatsbus a retfa knab a fo llaftrohs latipac detcepxEsknaB)7102( elgnE dna seelnworBKSIRS
equity markets
DebtRank algorithm Battiston et al. (2012) and 
Bardoscia et al. (2015)
Several It allows for assessment of how an initial shock could propagate 
through the network, whether in calm or stressed periods, and for 
an estimation of the influence of specific financial institutions on the 
network
 laicnanif yb deussi stessa fo sgnidloh wohs serusopxe tceriDlareveS—ssendetcennocretni tceriD
sectors themselves
 fo sgnidloh nommoc fo tnuoma eht sesirpmoc palrevo oiloftroPlareveS—ssendetcennocretni tceridnI
instruments issued by both financial and non-financial sectors 
(calculated at the issuer level). Another indicator is the portfolio 
correlation coefficient of the holdings of each sector pair on each 
date, a measure that quantifies the extent of similarity of the 
distribution of the securities in the portfolios
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